LOWERING THE STAKES
Process matters as much as substance. Increasingly, mediators such as Pakistan, Oman and China appear to favour “sequenced de escalation”. This is where limited reciprocal steps, including mutual adherence to ceasefire agreements, shipping guarantees and relaxation of both sides’ maritime blockades, are locked in before negotiations widen to sanctions relief and regional security.
This approach lowers the political stakes of any single concession and reduces the risk that talks collapse under the weight of unresolved disputes. However, this scenario would make it harder for the US administration to define the agreement as a victory.
Similarly, there is the question of political narrative. The US president has vacillated between threats of overwhelming force and signals of fatigue with the conflict. This suggests he has a strong desire for an exit that can be framed as victory.
A narrowly defined agreement that could be rebranded, front-loaded with Iranian compliance and heavy on enforcement language may prove more acceptable than a comprehensive treaty – even if its substance closely resembles older Obama-era frameworks.
The problem is the Trump administration’s failure to maintain a consistent narrative of what it wants from Iran. This presents a challenge to the established research on conflict resolution. The US president, in particular, has made understanding the US position difficult. In years to come, this crisis may be a useful case study when it comes to exploring conflict resolution theory. But, right now, it makes a settlement very hard to envisage.
David J Galbreath is Professor of War and Technology at University of Bath. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.