Ukraine, which had no choice but to learn fast, eventually figured out a better answer. Ukraine developed cheap interceptor drones that could slam into Shahed drones before they reached their targets. Each interceptor costs about US$1,000 to US$2,000, and Ukrainian manufacturers are producing thousands of them per month. That’s better math: a US$2,000 interceptor against a US$20,000 attacker.
Ukraine’s battlefield experience, as a result, has become one of the most valuable resources in the world, with American and allied forces asking Ukrainian drone experts to share their knowledge.
Why can’t the US churn out a solution of its own? Because the US military doesn’t have a technology problem but a bureaucracy problem.
THE PENTAGON’S THREE-LEGGED SLOWDOWN
The US Department of Defense typically can’t just buy things. It follows a long, complicated process that can take a decade or more to go from “we need something” to “here it is”. That process runs through three separate bureaucratic systems, each of which can cause years of delay.
First, someone must write a formal document, known as a requirement, that explains exactly what they need and why. A military service, such as the Air Force, for example, drafts up a requirement and routes it through an internal service review within only their branch.
Until recently, this service-vetted requirement went through a Pentagon review process, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, where all joint services took a look. This process, which the Department of Defense ended in 2025, required approval from military officials.
Even though the joint requirements process was ended, implementation of a new system is far from complete, and the existing culture potentially remains. Under the old requirements process, it took over 800 days to get a requirement approved.